

Redefining Division and Corps Competencies: Are Divisions and Corps Training to Fight Joint?

**A Monograph
by
Major William R. Abb
United States Army**

School of Advanced Military Studies

**United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

First Term AY 99-00

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major William R. Abb

**Title of Monograph: Redefining Division and Corps Competencies: Are Divisions
and Corps Training to Fight Joint?**

Approved by:

LTC Robert L. Chadwick, MS **Monograph Director**

COL Robin P. Swan, MMAS **Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies**

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. **Director, Graduate Degree
Program**

Accepted this 30 Day of December 1999

Abstract

Redefining Division and Corps Competencies: Are Divisions and Corps Training to Fight Joint? By MAJ William R. Abb, U.S. Army, 77 pages.

The fundamental assumptions the U.S. Army makes between the most likely (small-scale contingency/ stability and support operations) and most dangerous (high intensity/ major theater war) contingencies drive all subsequent decisions over apportioning limited resources, force structure, training and equipment in an organization where division and corps commanders serve two masters. The two masters are manifested in the dilemma of resourcing and doctrine to support the divergence of requirements to operate as organic division and corps headquarters conducting traditional missions in a major theater war (MTW) or operate as an Army Forces (ARFOR), Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) or Joint Task Force (JTF) conducting small-scale contingency operations. An examination of National Command Authority (NCA) guidance, recent U.S. military operations, contingency plans for the warfighting CinCs and Army and joint doctrine shows that Army divisions and corps are expected to operate as joint headquarters.

Without examining the question of whether these divisions and corps are organized and equipped to operate at that level, this monograph offers an answer to the research question; does the current training model for divisions and corps support employment as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF? The answer is no. The wartime focus of Army training doctrine, lack of authoritative joint doctrine for peacetime training as well as the lack of doctrine at the operational level for the JFLCC represent significant gaps in providing the direction necessary to ensure success when operating as a headquarters within this very complex environment. When coupled with the changing strategic environment outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) and the expectation for divisions and corps from contingency plans and recent operations, it is the assertion of this author, that these headquarters are not given the tools to train in the division and corps level staff competencies necessary to deal with the complexities of the joint environment as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF and that any opportunity to train the division and corps staff outside of a joint environment is perhaps an inefficient use of scarce resources.

In arriving at this conclusion, this paper established criteria to evaluate the current training model through the affirmation or refutation of supporting or nested research questions. The paper then followed a methodical path to: firstly, establish the need for and likelihood of these headquarters serving as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF; secondly, establish that current division and corps training, in terms of combat training centers (CTC) and joint exercise programs, does not adequately support the requirements to serve as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF; thirdly, establish that current Army and joint doctrine does not support the employment of these headquarters serving as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF. Finally, this paper concludes that shortfalls in training staff competencies do not represent a need to fundamentally change the way these headquarters are trained.

Table of Contents

TITLE PAGE	i
APPROVAL SHEET	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
INTRODUCTION	1
CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGY	3
LITERATURE REVIEW	4
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT	11
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (NSS)	12
THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY (NMS)	14
HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF RECENT MILITARY OPERATIONS	19
OPERATION URGENT FURY	20
OPERATION JUST CAUSE	20
OPERATION DESSERT SHIELD AND DESSERT STORM	21
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE	23
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY	24
OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR (IFOR)	25
CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND TRAINING	27
DOCTRINE	30
ARMY DOCTRINE	31
JOINT DOCTRINE	37
SUMMARY, ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS	40

RECOMMENDATIONS	47
ENDNOTES	51
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	65

Introduction

As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States Army

The identification of potential missions and roles for the military begins with the National Command Authority (NCA) as they identify the strategic environment, likely threats to national interests and the requirements for the different instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic).¹ This assessment is captured in a number of congressionally mandated and historically prepared reports including the President's annual National Security Strategy (NSS), the Secretary of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) National Military Strategy. These reports along with the strategic assessment of the combatant commanders form the foundation for generating the assumptions necessary to conduct campaign planning. They also provide the first insights into the expected use of military force to meet national interests.²

The post cold war era can be characterized by an evolution in national strategic and military strategies. This evolution can be traced from the Weinberger Doctrine of the 1980s, through the Bush administration's transition from "containment" to (selective and discriminate) "collective engagement," to the Clinton administration, which placed "physical security, value projection and economic prosperity...under the overarching strategic concepts of engagement and enlargement."³ This current strategy of engagement has moved the military from its historic role of winning the nations wars to a role of promoting prosperity.⁴

The last two decades also demonstrate an unprecedented rise in the traditional and nontraditional use of the military. Many expected the fall of the Berlin Wall to usher in a historic period of peace and prosperity. Instead, the security environment remains incredibly dynamic, with threats and challenges that have actually increased the demands upon the military instrument of national power.⁵ Operations in Grenada, Panama, Iraq/Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo send the clearest message possible of the U.S. commitment to its national interests and give the strongest indications of the most likely employment of military force in the future.

The strategic landscape has clearly changed and the fundamental assumptions the Army makes between the most likely (small scale contingency operations/security and support) and most dangerous (major theater war) contingencies drive all subsequent decisions over apportioning limited resources, structure, training and equipment in an organization where division and corps commanders serve two masters. The two masters are manifested in the dilemma of resourcing and doctrine to support the divergence of requirements to operate as organic division and corps headquarters conducting traditional missions in a major theater war (MTW) or operate as an Army Forces (ARFOR), Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) or Joint Task Force (JTF) conducting small-scale contingency operations.

An examination of recent military operations in the United States as well as the contingency plans for the warfighting CinCs shows that Army divisions and corps are expected to operate as joint headquarters.⁶ This notion is reinforced at every level within the civil-military community and captured in the most recent Army and joint doctrine.⁷ Without examining the question of whether these divisions and corps are organized and

equipped to operate at that level, this monograph asks whether they are trained in the division and corps level staff competencies necessary to deal with the complexities of the joint environment. Additionally this monograph determines what shortfalls exist between Army and joint doctrine in preparing these organizations to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict in and out of the joint environment.

Criteria and Methodology

This monograph is a study into the fundamental question of what tasks Army divisions and corps should train on in an uncertain strategic environment? Specifically, whether the current training model for divisions and corps supports employment as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF?

The criteria used to evaluate the current training model are less empirical and more argumentative. They are the affirmation or refutation of supporting or nested research questions: what is the current strategic environment which determines the need and likelihood of these headquarters serving as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF; what is the nature of current training to determine if these headquarters are training to serve as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF; and finally, does current Army and joint doctrine support the employment of these headquarters serving as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF? Satisfaction of these questions allows for the assertion of solid and supportable conclusions about the main research question.

The study begins by examining the current body of literature related to the research question and how the findings compliment or add to that existing body of knowledge. Attempts to redefine the strategic environment and the use of the military instrument of national power are the focus of a tremendous amount of current political-

military writing. The sheer volume of work speaks to the relevancy and contentious nature of this subject.

The examination shifts to building an understanding of the linkage between members of the U.S. civil-military structure responsible for this strategic coordination. This is key to the subsequent understanding of the military instrument of national power and the development of broad military capabilities, their worldwide posture, and their functional and geographic orientation.⁸ This monograph is not meant to provide an exhaustive analysis of the National Command Authority (NCA) but simply to establish an understanding of the responsibilities for strategic coordination as codified in law and practice.

This paper examines the requirements passed on to the Army through CinC strategic assessments, contingencies and theater engagement plans as well as a historical examination of recent military operations to suggest the most likely employment of Army divisions and corps in the future. It then examines the current training model used in the Army to determine what staff level competencies are trained and what guidance and direction Army and Joint doctrine provides in the formulation of these training tasks. Finally, it determines what shortfalls exist between Army and Joint doctrine in placing the responsibility for training divisions and corps to operate as required for their most likely employment.

Literature Review

Understanding the strategic environment and the nature of modern conflict and warfare is the critical first step in establishing the most likely and most dangerous threats to U.S. national interests. Understanding these threats is critical to determining the most

likely use of the military instrument of national power. The most likely use of this instrument of national power determines the resourcing and missions given to the military.

The conclusions drawn by this paper on the current strategic environment, the nature of modern conflict and warfare, and the most likely use of military force, do not necessarily represent original thought. They represent a sampling of the collective body of knowledge available to draw upon for debate.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, reunification of Germany, the breakup of the Soviet Union, ethnic and tribal fighting in Africa and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia have created a flood of commentary, theory, conjecture and academic writing. Each author seeks to forward a view on the evolving strategic landscape and its implications. This paper serves to compliment that body of knowledge and to distill from a "wide cast" those thoughtful and supported conclusions which eventually help shape the findings and recommendations. To that end this literature review focuses on three areas: the culture of future conflict including technological innovation as a revolution in military affairs (RMA), military security and support operations, and finally, joint training.

An examination into the culture of future conflict reveals a number of interesting positions including the works of some rather prominent theorists (political/social commentary) as they search for a new world order. Futurists such as Alvin and Heidi Toffler in their book *War and Anti-War*, divide the world into economically competing tiers based largely on the ability to utilize information.⁹ In his book *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington argues that conflict will rage along cultural lines.¹⁰ Robert Kaplan in his book, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st*

Century, suggests a world characterized by disintegrated states with the developed world at odds with the undeveloped world.¹¹ Finally, Michael Ignatieff in his book, *The Warrior's Honor*, offers a compelling view of moral interventionism in places where ethnic war has become a way of life.¹²

This view is similar to that of Ralph Peters who suggests the greatest challenge may be to our moral order. Furthermore, "dangers that could spark broad conventional wars will be resource competition and cultural confrontations—or a volatile combination of both... [with] a triage approach to diplomacy, aid, and interventions, and a sobered West... selective in its military deployments, concentrating on financial interests and lifestyle protection. By the middle of the next century, if not before, the overarching mission of our military will be the preservation of our quality of life."¹³

Steven Metz suggests several alternatives as a caution to what he characterizes as the orthodox position within the Army and the Department of Defense, "that the strategic environment of 2020 will be much like that of 1997." He argues that the orthodox view is one where sovereign nation states remain the most important political units. It "anticipates dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of militaries able to capitalize on the revolution in military affairs made possible by information technology" but holds to the notion that "war will remain essentially political, episodic, violent, state-centric, and distinct from peace. The orthodox position expects only evolutionary change in the strategic environment." Metz contends that the strategic environment will be a mixture of four alternatives: a trisected security system; the renaissance of ideology; internal collapse; and the commercialization of warfare. In most cases, traditional state-on-state warfare is insignificant.¹⁴

In *Military Review*, Graham Turbiville, William Mendel and Jacob Kipp characterize the future nature of war with shifting regional alignments, the development of security threats not limited by national boundaries or affiliations, an interagency character of assessing and responding to threats, weapon and military technology proliferation and the rapid pace of change. They suggest that traditional relationships and alliances should be critically examined given the transitional nature and diversity of many key threats creating an environment where change, uncertainty and surprise are vital considerations in developing national and regional military strategies.¹⁵

Many authors who posit a theory about the culture of future conflict suggest that technological innovations and war in the information age represent a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Authors from GEN (Ret) Gordon R. Sullivan, BG James M. Dubik, Michael Mazarr, Steven Metz and a host of others are very prolific as they embrace or caution against the implications of technology.¹⁶

In their *Parameters* article, Paul Riper and Robert Scales takes some of these concerns further by suggesting that emerging technology enhances our capabilities but creates a misperception about technological supremacy. They write that, "...in the end, war is a contest of human wills, not machines, in which means must be subordinated to ends if the results are to justify the costs. In the world we confront, those ends are likely to be more complicated, and the circumstances in which they must be pursued less predictable, than ever before in our history. A military posture that evades rather than accommodates that reality is doomed to expensive irrelevance."¹⁷

Robert Baumann in a *Military Review* article suggests that we cannot lose sight of history in our rush toward technological innovation. He writes that, "The modern

fascination with cutting-edge technologies and their undeniable impact on war often obscures our view of war's other dimensions. Historians have widely noted the social, political and economic factors in shaping the evolution of conflict. Cultural and intellectual changes have played a powerful role as well."¹⁸

Finally, within the future culture of conflict is the notion that sovereignty has become subordinated to moral and regional stability interests when expressed by some collective international consensus. Recent operations in Kosovo serve as an example of the international community walking a fine line between meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and imposing its will without challenging the right to govern. Consensus is often fragile, media attention fleeting, sporadic or absent, and the costs in men, material and prestige are often great.

When the U.S. chooses to meet these challenges with military force, the impact is felt throughout the entire Department of Defense. This impact is often measured in operational tempo, wear and tear on equipment, funding, etc., but the greatest impact is felt on readiness in terms of the ability to respond to other contingencies, maintain credible deterrence and in accomplishing the primary mission of fighting two near-simultaneous major theater wars (MTW).

The impact on readiness, conduct of stability and support operations, their integration into Mission Essential Task List (METL) development and concerns about effectively meeting requirements across the entire spectrum of conflict serves as the second area of focus for this review. These subjects have gotten a tremendous amount of attention recently, especially among Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship Program (AOASFP) students. These

articles and monographs offer a variety of perspectives on challenging issues.¹⁹ How should the U.S. military train for peace? Does the Army's current doctrine support adding stability and support operations (SASO) or peacekeeping tasks to unit METLs? What is the cost to readiness for conducting SASO missions? What are the realities of the U.S. as the only remaining superpower within the Presidents National Security Strategy for the next century?

Many of these authors forego a lengthy justification for assumptions about the nature of future involvement in SASO missions. The evolution of their work shows significant consensus for this conclusion. The focus has shifted from whether the U.S. will conduct these missions to the impact on more fundamental issues of structuring the force, resourcing, training, readiness, responsiveness and politically charged issues of when to stop, contain or watch conflict continue.

A number of studies address the doctrinal dilemma associated with training for non-traditional missions. There appears to be no consensus among authors on the transferability of tasks across the spectrum of conflict. Although many tasks are the same in name, the conditions under which they are executed vary significantly.²⁰ The *FM 100-5, Operations* writing team in its concept paper on the doctrinal focus of FM 100-5 concludes that core proficiencies will be enhanced rather than degraded by deployments across the full spectrum of conflict that test the versatility and cohesiveness of units and "facilitate the rapid return to warfighting task proficiency after deployment."²¹ A number of authors suggest that the increased expectation for conducting stability and support operations place leaders at odds with doctrine in the development of METL tasks and training for their most likely missions. These studies conclude that current Army

doctrine does not support the addition of peacekeeping tasks to unit METL.²² Later analysis will determine whether these conclusions prove to be supported or are simply based upon too literal an interpretation of doctrine and that the apparent lack of flexibility really represents a lack of balance justified by resource constraints and the primacy of war time missions. It can be argued however, that many tasks and the conditions under which they will be executed in a SASO environment are not formally captured in Mission Training Plans.²³

This lack of doctrinal guidance is not limited to small unit tactics but is pervasive throughout Army operational and joint doctrine. The subject of joint training in terms of joint doctrine development, battle staff training and command and control is the final focus of this literature review. This area shares a number of characteristics in common with the previous focus on SASO. There has been a tremendous amount of work written and that work shows an evolutionary trend toward the accepted consensus that future operations are going to be "joint." GEN Shinseki has repeatedly driven these sentiments home since his assumption of duties as the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA).²⁴ It is through this discussion that the need to evaluate how we organize, train, employ, deploy, fight and redeploy becomes germane and the research question gains its relevance.

A number of studies suggest that Army and Joint doctrine have not fully bridged the gap in order to support the rapid response to threats across the entire spectrum of conflict. For those who condemn this lack of authoritative direction, there are equally strong arguments for a doctrine suitably flexible to the uncertainties of the current strategic environment. Historical examples and recent operations are cited to suggest the difficult nature of ad hoc reactions in crisis action planning. Conclusions range from

standing regional or functional JTFs, augmenting service component headquarters, dispatching elements of unified or major command headquarters, corps serving as JFLCCs and JTFs and versatility training for battle staffs.²⁵ The unifying thread running through all these studies is that the current strategic environment and the nature of modern conflict is such that in order to be decisive and relevant, the military needs to react quickly and with seamless integration of joint and combined or coalition forces. In order to perform to this standard, the units called upon to execute cannot be ad hoc or untrained.²⁶ The remainder of this paper will address how prepared divisions and corps are to meet that standard and whether commanders are empowered with the right tools to ensure success.

The Strategic Environment

The literature review places this paper in the proper context and assists in establishing the relevancy of the research question. It is here, through an exhaustive examination of what Joint doctrine calls the "Unity of Effort" that the facts are established for later analysis. This monograph examines the strategic environment as established by the National Command Authority (NCA) through such sources as the National Security Strategy for the Next Century and the National Military Strategy of Shape, Respond, Prepare Now to identify the requirements for the military instrument of national power. It will examine the requirements passed on to the Army through CinC contingencies and theater engagement plans as well as a historical examination of recent military operations to suggest the most likely employment of Army divisions and corps in the future. It will examine the current training model used in the Army to determine what staff level competencies are trained. Finally it will examine Army and Joint doctrine to

determine what guidance is provided for the development of training to prepare divisions and corps to operate as required for their most likely employment.

The National Security Strategy (NSS)

The National Security Strategy is a document prepared by the President of the United States as required in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.²⁷ It is an annual strategy that discusses as a minimum: vital global U.S. interests and objectives; proposed short and long term use of all elements of national power to achieve U.S. objectives; and the commitments and defense capabilities required to deter aggression and implement the strategy while achieving a balance among all elements of power.²⁸

Since its inception in 1986 the strategy and its annual report have undergone an evolution as the result of events in Europe and the former Soviet Union. It may be argued that this evolution has not resulted in a more defined or certain strategic environment. The Reagan administration simply continued its Cold War focus with a strategy emphasizing the military instrument of power and dominated by the Weinberger Doctrine.²⁹ This doctrine left little room for interpretation and was backed by an administration respected for its commitment to revitalizing the Armed Forces and for its consistent foreign policy positions. The Bush administration took on the formidable task of trying to grapple with monumental change in Europe and the Soviet Union. It served to bridge the gap between containment and collective engagement. The strategy during this period "addressed all the elements of national power and tied them into regional strategies while focusing on...core national interests."³⁰ Regional instability in Southwest Asia (Iraq/Kuwait), Africa and the Balkans helped shape a strategy that emphasized the

“need to be selective and discriminate in our global undertakings.”³¹ The Clinton Administration returned to a strategy emphasizing free trade and which placed “physical security, value projection and economic prosperity...under the overarching strategic concepts of engagement and enlargement.”³² This current strategy of engagement has moved the military from its historic role of winning the nations wars to a role of promoting prosperity.³³

The current strategy, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, “calls for an integrated approach among the instruments of national power to accomplish three core objectives: To enhance our security, to bolster America’s economic prosperity, and to promote democracy abroad.”³⁴ This strategy acknowledges that the security environment in which we live “is dynamic and uncertain, replete with a host of threats and challenges that have the potential to grow more deadly, but also offering unprecedented opportunities to avert those threats and advance our interests.”³⁵ This strategy also reflects the Presidents decision to exercise leadership abroad stating that, “we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we cannot lead abroad unless we are strong at home. We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors.”³⁶

The NSS outlines the use of the military instrument of national power in a very challenging strategic environment from small-scale contingency operations to general war. Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. Citizens, reinforcing key allies, and limited strikes and intervention. These operations will likely pose the

most frequent challenge for U.S. forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time. These operations will also put a premium on the ability of the U.S. military to work closely and effectively with other U.S. Government agencies, non-governmental organizations, regional and international security organizations and coalition partners.³⁷

Not only must the U.S. military be prepared to successfully conduct multiple smaller-scale contingencies worldwide, it must be prepared to do so in the face of challenges such as terrorism, information operations and the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. forces must also remain prepared to withdraw from contingency operations if needed to deploy to a major theater war. Accordingly, appropriate U.S. forces will be kept at a high level of readiness and will be trained, equipped and organized to be multi-mission capable.³⁸

The National Military Strategy (NMS)

A brief summary of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provides an excellent explanation of how the unity of effort for the military instrument of national power takes its direction from the NMS and translates that guidance into joint planning for the development of peacetime engagement and wartime contingency plans. A number of interrelated national-level systems impact upon the development of these plans including; the National Security Council (NSC) system which generates National Security Directives (NSD) and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) which through the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), generates Chairman's Guidance, the National Military Strategy, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans (JSCP), the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and other joint planning guidance.³⁹

The National Security Council System is the principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharges a substantial part of his statutory responsibilities as the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense through the institutional channels of the NSC. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly attends NSC meetings and presents the Chairman's views and those of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders.⁴⁰

The JSPS is the primary formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CinCs, carries out his statutory responsibilities to review the national security environment, objectives and propose military strategies to achieve those national objectives consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and the Secretary of Defense.⁴¹

The four products of this system are the National Military Strategy, Joint Planning Document (JPD), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). The central process of the JSPS is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) which continually gathers information and assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that affect the National Military Strategy (NMS). JSR Issue Papers presented to the Chairman, Chiefs of the Services, and CinCs provide arguments for proposed changes to the NMS, Joint Planning Document (JPD), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and elicit Chairman's Guidance for changing the military strategy if required.⁴²

For the purposes of this paper the key products are the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the National Military Strategy. The JSCP provides guidance to the CinCs and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to CinCs, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA. The CPG fulfills the Secretary of Defense's statutory duty to provide annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff written policy guidance for contingency planning. The Secretary provides this guidance with the approval of the President after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPG focuses the guidance provided in the NMS and DPG and directly impacts on the JSCP.⁴³

As stated in the National Military Strategy (NMS) its purpose is to, "provide advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Combatant Commanders, to the National Command Authorities (NCA) on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces...the NMS describes the strategic environment, develops national military objectives, and describes the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. As an unclassified document, it makes this advice accessible to the widest range of government officials, interested citizens and foreign leaders."⁴⁴

Surprisingly, the NMS is not a required document.⁴⁵ It is the result of a need for direction in light of the post cold war draw down. The first report was rendered in January 1992 by then CJCS Gen Colin Powell and was intended to outline "both the ways and means to achieve the controlled build-down of defense capabilities."⁴⁶ Today it plays

a vital role in linking the NSS and national objectives with the military instrument of national power. This strategy takes the form of objectives for the development of broad military capabilities, their worldwide posture, and their functional geographic orientation.⁴⁷

The current NMS published in 1997, entitled, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America; Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for the New Era*, carries forward the theme that U.S. military power is, and will continue to be, fundamental to ensuring our national security.⁴⁸ It states that the United States will remain the world's only global power for the near-term, but will operate in a strategic environment characterized by rising regional powers, asymmetric challenges including WMD, transnational dangers, and the likelihood of wild cards that cannot be specifically predicted.⁴⁹

The NMS builds on the premise that the U.S. will remain globally engaged in order to advance and protect our national interests defining its tasks in terms of Shaping, Responding and Preparing Now. The Armed Forces are to **Shape** the international environment by promoting stability throughout the world, preventing or reducing conflict and threats, and by peacetime deterrence. The Armed Forces must also be poised to **Respond** to the full spectrum of crisis by deterring aggression or coercion in crisis, fighting and winning major theater wars and by conducting multiple, concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations. Finally, the Armed Forces must **Prepare Now** for an uncertain future through information superiority and technological innovation.⁵⁰

In further defining tasks for the Armed Forces, the NMS concludes that "As we pursue the President's strategy for enhancing our security in this new era, the demand for

military capabilities and skills is unlikely to diminish, both to deter and defeat aggression in two distant and overlapping MTWs, and in roles other than traditional warfighting. Our Armed Forces' core competence –the ability to apply decisive military power to deter or defeat acts of aggression –must remain the primary consideration in determining the structure, training and employment of our military forces.”⁵¹

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has stated in the National Military Strategy, “while our Armed Forces maintain their core competence to defend the United States and overcome any nation that imperils U.S. security, the military has an important role in peacetime engagement.”⁵² In recognition of the military's role in advancing the National Security Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) now provides guidance to the Unified Commands and Services for planning peacetime engagement.⁵³

The process outlined to this point is quite significant and serves as the foundation on which later conclusions will be drawn to suggest the most likely use of the military instrument of national power in the near term. What can be discerned from this guidance is that the Armed Forces must be prepared to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of conflict with primacy of effort given to the preparations required to conduct two-near simultaneous major theater wars (MTW).

The primacy placed upon preparations for major theater war creates a cognitive tension that goes to the heart of the research question. The tension is created by guidance that can be described through a simple thought process that admittedly does not do justice to the full complexity of the issue.

The NCA guidance says the primary focus is on A (MTW) but expect to do B (small-scale contingency operations). In a resource constrained environment, focusing on the tasks associated with A requires marginalization of proficiency in the unique tasks associated with B. Continued real-world conduct of tasks associated with B results in a reduced proficiency in the unique tasks associated with A. The result is an organization that is not optimizing its ability to do either A or B. This problem is further compounded by the notion that in order to be most effective in small-scale contingency operations, the forces involved must have a demonstrated ability to operate at an escalated level of intensity should the need arise. This tension can be further supported through an examination of recent military operations and current contingency planning.

Historical Examination of Recent Military Operations

The last three decades have seen a significant increase in the use of the military instrument of national power including actions in Iran, the Gulf of Sidra, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, the Sinai, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama, Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The purpose of this brief historical review is not to provide an exhaustive examination of each operation or the ARTEP tasks performed, but simply examine some key operations to lay the groundwork for an assertion that these are the types of missions divisions and corps can expect to perform in the near future. Each operation is different and offers unique challenges to the headquarters responsible for planning and execution. Each summary highlights the nature of the mission, command relationships and some of the more significant issues. This list of operations is by no means all-inclusive but represents a cross section of the major

deployments. The information is drawn from a compilation of sources cited at the conclusion of each operation summary.

Operation URGENT FURY

Operation URGENT FURY and the U.S. assault on the Caribbean island of Grenada began on 25 October 1983. The operation, although generally successful, represents the complexity of multi-service operations, especially for an ad hoc organization unfamiliar with planning operations involving Army, Air Force and Special Operations Forces. The mission to evacuate U.S. noncombatants and neutralize Grenadine and Cuban armed forces was given to Admiral Wesley MacDonald, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command. On 23 October, Admiral MacDonald rejected use of the existing contingency framework to establish JTF 140 from U.S. Forces Caribbean and assigned the mission to Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, designating the 2nd Fleet as JTF 120. The 82nd Airborne Division and both battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment participated as the principal Army Forces. Operation URGENT FURY proved to be a watershed event in Army and Joint operations. The inability to properly plan, coordinate and control subordinate elements significantly jeopardized the success of the mission and needlessly cost the lives of American forces. This operation directly impacted upon changes incorporated in the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.⁵⁴

Operation JUST CAUSE

Operation JUST CAUSE and the U.S. assault on the Central American country of Panama began on 20 December 1989. The XVIII Airborne Corps was called upon to

serve as the JTF with the mission to maintain the freedom of transit through the Panama Canal, the removal of Manuel Noriega and his government from power and allow the freely elected government in Panama to govern. It is a model for non-linear, decentralized operations and is cited in FM 100-5 concept papers to contrast the current battlefield framework of deep, close, rear with a proposed framework of decisive, shaping and sustaining. The operation also represents how much the U.S. learned about joint operations since Grenada and serves as a model for employing a corps as a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters.

Although Operation JUST CAUSE is a valuable example of a corps serving as a JTF it does not serve well as an example of crisis action planning and short-duration contingency operations. Operation JUST CAUSE was a predominately single service operation with a relatively small force and large portions of the Corps headquarters that did not deploy. The corps, which was designated as JTF SOUTH was given a full six months prior to execution of the mission to plan and rehearse the operation including the use of forces already deployed in the JOA. Furthermore, the corps was augmented by a joint staff from U.S. Southern Command that had conducted the majority of the deliberate planning over the previous year. "The corps was essentially augmented by a pre-existing joint staff that was instrumental in developing a great deal of the operations plan."⁵⁵

Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM serve as the high-water mark for U.S. post-cold war force projection, annihilation warfare. They validated decades of doctrinal work that sought to capture the essence of operational art. They ushered in a period of burden sharing through coalition building and public opinion and

legitimacy based upon presidential communication with the American public and United Nations Security Council Resolutions authorizing the use of force.

Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM began on 9 August 1990 as the Forward Headquarters Element (FHE) of the U.S. Central Command began arriving in Saudi Arabia along with the lead combat troops of the XVIII Airborne Corps and elements of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing. What ensued in the early days of the operation has been characterized as a headquarters more interested in generating the flow into theater than managing the defensive framework of units on the ground.

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM are also operations where the Geographic CINC (General Schwarzkopf) elected to maintain command at his level without establishing a subordinate JFLCC. It is widely believed that although this was the CinC's prerogative, it created some command relationship issues that could have been more readily resolved. It is also commonly held that this command structure is not characteristic of what we can expect in the near future where geographic or theater CinCs can afford to become completely immersed in the activities within only one portion of his theater.

Finally, these operations represent an unresolved "hot spot" which, along with the Korean peninsula garner the lion's share of attention for mid to high-intensity contingencies. In 1998 alone, U.S. Central Command exercised contingencies to reinforce the theater in three separate operations; DESSERT THUNDER I, DESSERT THUNDER II and DESSERT FOX.⁵⁶

Operation RESTORE HOPE

Operation RESTORE HOPE began on 20 November 1992 when the U.S. Central Command issued a warning order to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) designating I MEF as the combined joint task force (CJTF) for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. The force would be known as Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) headed by the commander of I MEF, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston. The legal authority for this operation would come from United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 which authorized the use of "all necessary means" to provide security for the delivery of relief supplies in Somalia.

The 10th Mountain Division (L) assumed the daunting task of serving as the Army Forces (ARFOR) headquarters operating with forces from more than 20 different nations. This operation highlights the need for joint and coalition forces and the operational complexity it generates. Most importantly, it shows that a division can serve as an ARFOR under the right conditions. The initial planning process serves to highlight the complexity of parallel planning as the division maintained coordination with four headquarters (XVIII Airborne Corps, I MEF, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Forces Command). It highlights the constraints at the operational and tactical level of force caps generated before mission analysis is complete and courses of action are developed.

Operation RESTORE HOPE brought to light a number of issues for future military humanitarian operations. The most significant of these issues are clearly defined end states, measures of effectiveness toward reaching that end state and coordination with governmental and non-governmental organizations. The operation was to be of limited duration but I MEF received no clear definition of the end state or time frame. The

mission was to provide security for the distribution of humanitarian food supplies, which assumed that the mission would end when security was restored to the degree that the United Nations could assume full responsibility. This level of security was never explicitly defined and it led to an evolution of tasks that appeared to lose sight of the initial mandate ending with the ill fated Ranger and Delta Force raid to capture members of Aidid's clan. It also created perhaps an overemphasized concern for "force protection" and "mission creep" in future operations.⁵⁷

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

It can be argued that the real mission of operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was to stop the influx of Haitian immigrants into Southern Florida. The stated mission however, was the restoration of the Aristide government, neutralization of armed factions and the reestablishment of civic order. This included free and secure elections, training of a new police force and reestablishing the functioning judicial structure.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY began in earnest on 19 September 1994 following a tense face off and last minute negotiations by a U.S. delegation (lead by former President Jimmy Carter, Senator San Nunn and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN (Ret) Colin Powell) and representatives of Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras' ruling regime. The resultant Carter-Jonaissant agreement provided for Cedras to relinquish power and narrowly avoided the non-permissive insertion of JTF 180 forces enroute from the 82nd Airborne Division.

Two operation plans (OPLANs) were developed for the operation with JTF 180 formed from XVIII Airborne Corps and responsible for the forced entry plan with airborne and amphibious forces in a non-permissive environment. JTF 190, consisting of light

infantry forces was to follow into a permissive environment to conduct MOOTW operations. Each JTF was subordinate to United States Atlantic Command and when the mission for JTF 180 was rescinded it left JTF 190 entering the area of operations without substantial life-support or C2.

The 10th Mountain Division (L) was formed as JTF 190, the nucleus of the Multinational Forces Haiti (MNF Haiti), a U.S. led coalition force including contributors from 20 different nations. This operation is unique in that it represents a division serving as the JTF headquarters. What we find is that the division accomplished this task but not without significant augmentation nearly tripling the size of the division staff.

The 10th Mountain Division and two battalions of the 3rd Special Forces Group were the principal U.S. Army combat units that deployed to Haiti in October 1994. The 25th Infantry Division (L) replaced the 10th Mountain Division (L) in January 1995 and on 31 March 1995 transitioned to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

There are a number of lessons learned from this operation that are key to future operations. The first as already mentioned is that OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY shows that a division can serve as a JTF headquarters under the right conditions. It represents the establishment of multiple JTFs with very different missions, expected to be conducted sequentially, and the flexibility, (especially in adjusting the TPFDL) required to react to change. Finally, it represents a substantial step forward in joint interoperability where the 10th Mountain used an aircraft carrier as the intermediate staging base (ISB) to rapidly place a brigade sized force on the ground.⁵⁸

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (IFOR)

The Implementation Force (IFOR) entered Bosnia in December 1995. It was

unique in that it represented the first out-of-area operation by NATO and brought into a coalition forces from NATO, Partnership for Peace (PFP) countries and others including forces from Russia under one unified command structure.

JOINT ENDEAVOR was a NATO led operation under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) implementing United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The Command structure ran from the NAC through the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC) to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The SACEUR designated the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) to serve as the operational-level headquarters and Commander of the Implementation Force (COMIFOR). Commanding the subordinate multinational divisions was the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). There is some debate as to whether this command relationship can be characterized with AFSOUTH as the JTF and the ARRC as the JFLCC or ARFOR.

The principal U.S. combat force deployed as part of IFOR was the 1st Armored Division, forward deployed in Germany. It served as the nucleus of forces in the United States sector of Multi-National Division (North). Their mission under the General Framework Agreement (otherwise known as the Dayton Peace Accords) was to ensure continued compliance with the cease-fire, ensure the withdrawal of forces from the zone of separation, monitoring heavy weapons cantonment sites thus creating the conditions for the withdrawal of UN forces and economic recovery.

What is significant about the role that 1st Armored Division played is that it represents a U.S. Army division, in a multi-national command relationship without its parent Corps headquarters. Granted, the chain-of-command is heavily weighted with U.S.

officers, this may not always be the case. The division also placed substantial reliance upon the United States European Command (USEUCOM, USAREUR) for national administration and logistical support.⁵⁹

Contingency Planning and Training

The intent of examining current contingency plans is not to perform predictive analysis for the Army as a whole or for individual divisions and corps on employment options for all developed contingencies under the current JSCP. Instead, through a sampling of contingency planning, gather enough information to suggest reasonable, supportable assertions for the most likely employment of divisions and corps in support of the strategic environment as understood by geographic combatant commanders.⁶⁰

The examination yielded contingency planning that can be summarized by a quote from the Chief of Staff of the Army in TRADOC Pam 525-5, FORCE XXI OPERATIONS, 1 August 1994. In this pamphlet the CSA states that, "Rather than a single, focused threat, America's twenty-first century Army faces a broad range of challenges."⁶¹ The complexity of our strategic environment and the NMS of shaping, responding and preparing requires the flexibility to commit tailored force packages in response to immediate requirements that do not conform to any available deliberate planning products.

Many units are dual apportioned with requirements in multiple theaters. Additionally, current troop rotations for operations in Bosnia and Kosovo require significant adjustments to contingency plans when traditional task organizations cannot be provided. Finally, another issue significant to this discussion is the Army's modernization plans and fielding of digital equipment. Certainly, for the near-term, planners must

contend with integrating active and reserve component units that are equipped with either digital, Legacy or Legacy Plus equipment.

Most significant from the examination, that later analysis will further detail, is not that this complexity, troop rotations and equipment hampers the ability for combatant CinCs to fully predict the units that will respond to their theater. What is significant is that the nature of these contingencies is almost exclusively joint no matter who gets tagged to respond. This makes the nature of training quite germane and the tasks that these units train to in a time of ever increasing resource constraints is crucial to ensuring their success, ensuring relevancy and responsiveness for the Army, and ensuring that the national interests of the United States are protected or furthered.

What tasks divisions and corps train to is evident in no better event than the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) warfighter. BCTP is a self-sufficient Combat Training Center (CTC), headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas providing command and battle staff training for division and corps commanders, their battle staffs, major subordinate commanders and supporting SOF units, using simulation centers worldwide.⁶² The scope of training at the BCTP is the corps and division with the focus on command and control. Units establish objectives for CTC training based upon their unit mission essential task list (METL), the commander's assessment of wartime missions, home station training programs, and unit proficiency.⁶³

An examination of the training objectives from recent Warfighter Exercises (WFX) conducted by BCTP reveals that divisions and corps use this training event to work on core conventional warfighting competencies. In nearly all cases the units concentrated on a narrow portion of the fight (assembly area to actions on the objective)

while forgoing the tasks associated with deploying into theater or integrating into a joint or multinational environment. While BCTP maintains the capability to assess deployment tasks (force packaging, building and flowing the TPFDD/TPFDL), to this point no unit has established this as a training objective. Units habitually assigned to contingency missions and units returning from stability and support operations chose tasks associated with reestablishing competencies in core, conventional (offense, defense) fights. One unit in particular stated as their first training objective to refocus on conventional operations including commanders and battle staff warfighting tasks; practice synchronizing the battlefield operating procedures (BOS) in a mid to high intensity environment; and battle command and staff operations at a conventional tempo.⁶⁴

This is not an indictment on BCTP or the mission of the CTC program. For divisions and corps, BCTP may prove to be the only conventional fight they expect to wage in the near term and has proven to be a valuable tool in exercising the military decision making process (MDMP) under conditions which approximate the stress and time constraints of crisis action planning during mid to high intensity warfare. It provides an excellent assessment of the decision-making across the division or corps and has proven a valuable tool in recent mission rehearsal exercises for Bosnia, Kuwait and Kosovo.⁶⁵ Later analysis will attempt to determine if this program is being properly leveraged to maximize the training potential available when viewed as any constrained resource to be applied across an entire spectrum of potential requirements.

Having examined the current strategic environment through its development process, recent historical examples and contingency plans we begin to amass the facts

necessary to base assumptions for the most likely employment of divisions and corps in the near-term. These assumptions are key as the focus now turns to Army and Joint doctrine.

Doctrine

Doctrine is the fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.⁶⁶ Doctrine is informed by theory. What we learned from the literature review and the national level process for identifying the strategic environment, is that much of modern conflict and thus the missions that the Armed Forces are going to be asked to perform (stability and support, MOOTW), lack a coherent theory or predictive model. This lack of a coherent theory directly impacts the ability to generate consensus within the instruments of national power, the Department of Defense and Joint and service staffs for conflict resolution. Without consensus, it is difficult to provide authoritative direction.

The cognitive tension discussed earlier that exists in establishing the primacy of major theater war from NCA guidance continues in the operational and training focus of doctrine. Operationally, this tension is represented in the dilemma of focusing doctrine on prompt and sustained land combat or on a more comprehensive approach, providing direction for all Army operations.⁶⁷ In training this dilemma is represented in attempting to balance resources to provide training proficiency across the entire spectrum of conflict.

What we will find is that doctrine further reasserts the primacy of this wartime focus while establishing how divisions and corps can employ and the complexities of operating in traditional and joint roles. In training doctrine, the primacy of this wartime

focus is incorporated as the key input in a prioritization process that either explicitly or implicitly directs commanders to focus their limited training resources in a narrow end of the spectrum. In joint doctrine what appears to be missing is any comprehensive and authoritative direction on how to train for joint requirements in peacetime.

Army Doctrine

The American Army is a doctrine-based, value-centered organization committed to serving the nation.

Field Manual 100-1, The Army (page v)

This examination of Army doctrine is intended to answer the following questions: what does Army doctrine say about how the Army divisions and corps are going to be employed; what does Army doctrine say about the missions Army divisions and corps headquarters are expected to perform; and what does Army doctrine say about training? To that end, this examination is less concerned with what doctrine says a headquarters should do once they are given a mission and more interested in what doctrine says a headquarters should do when given indications (recent operations, contingency plans, warning orders) that lead to an expectation of missions in the future. Later analysis will determine if doctrine provides suitable flexibility to divisions and corps to prepare to meet these expected missions.

As stated in *FM 100-1, The Army* is a doctrine-based, value-centered organization committed to serving the nation. This manual "provides a foundation for the Army's basic operational doctrine, expressed in *FM 100-5, Operations* and joint doctrine, set

forth in *Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*. All other Army doctrine flows from the principles and precepts contained in this manual.”⁶⁸

The introduction to the current *FM 100-5, Operations* (1993), states that, “The Army’s doctrine lies at the heart of its professional competence. It is the authoritative guide to how Army forces fight wars and conduct operations other than war.”⁶⁹ It continues, “Never static, always dynamic, the Army’s doctrine is firmly rooted in the realities of current capabilities. At the same time, it reaches out with a measure of confidence to the future. Doctrine captures the lessons of past wars, reflects the nature of war and conflict in its own time, and anticipates the intellectual and technological developments that will bring victory now and in the future.”⁷⁰


FM 100-5 is the keystone doctrine linking Army roles and missions to the National Military Strategy and providing authoritative guidance for how the Army thinks about and conducts operations. Acknowledging the change in the strategic environment, FM 100-5 is undergoing a dramatic evolutionary rewriting. Many of the proposed changes are captured in a number of concepts papers that followed the unsuccessful publication of a fully updated version in 1998. The significance of this change cannot be overstated. In concert with *FM 22-100, Army Leadership*, *FM 100-5, Operations* serves as a foundation for all of the Army’s doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development and soldier concerns.⁷¹ It would be irresponsible to prepare this paper without incorporating the proposed changes, especially in terms of the guidance provided to divisions and corps for future missions, Mission Essential Task List (METL) development and training.

What does Army doctrine say about how divisions and corps are employed?

Chapter 1 of *FM 100-15, Corps Operations* discusses the shifting expectations from a cold war focus to today. During the cold war the corps served almost exclusively as a tactical headquarters charged with synchronizing combat operations in support of operational objectives. Today, corps will most likely find themselves conducting force-projection operations as part of a tailored joint force. Future corps operations will be joint and often multinational in nature.⁷² *FM 100-15* later states that, "By its nature, the corps will always fight as part of a joint force, working closely with its sister services"⁷³ in its traditional role or as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF headquarters.

This shifting expectation is further captured in *FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*, *FM 100-8, The Army in Multinational Operations* as well as a number of Corps redesign and Corps XXI concept papers. A Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate draft paper entitled, *Corps as a Warfighting Headquarters* dated 23 June 1999 addresses the corps as an operational and tactical level of war headquarters. It further specifies all corps operations are at the joint level with its organization along current joint lines and its command and control operations based on the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) functional areas. The corps is a multifunctional flexible force enabled by technology and information and optimized for tactical warfighting in an austere, multinational and joint environment, capable of rapid transition between offense, defense, stability and support actions.⁷⁴

This concept paper offers an excellent model depicting when corps serve as tactical or EAC command and control headquarters.⁷⁵



This model demonstrates that the corps will serve as the lesser complexity headquarters the more severe the contingency and conversely the more complex C2 structure for the smaller scale contingencies.

What does Army doctrine say about the missions Army division and corps headquarters are expected to perform? The current generation of doctrine including *FM 100-5, Operations* (1993); *FM 71-100, Division Operations* (1990); *FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (1995); *FM 100-8, The Army in Multinational Operations* (1997) and *FM 100-15, Corps Operations* (1996) have their focus firmly entrenched in warfighting as the Army's primary mission while admitting that the Army is often called upon to do other missions.⁷⁶ These other missions, however, are subordinate in nature. *FM 100-23, Peace Operations* (1994) states that, "Training and preparation for peace operations should not detract from a unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat. The first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting skills."⁷⁷

Proposed changes to FM 100-5 will provide a comprehensive and full-spectrum doctrine that provides guidance for diverse operations without losing the focus on warfighting.⁷⁸ This doctrine will "establish the necessary constructs for the conduct of prompt and sustained operations on land in peacetime engagement, MTW and general war mission environments." It will address the full range of operations in joint, multinational and interagency contexts and provide a balanced approach to offense, defense stability, support and enabling activities.⁷⁹

In examining what Army doctrine says about training, the doctrinal focus on warfighting creates a possible dilemma among leaders in training their units for their

most likely employment. The current generation of doctrine with the concept of Battle Focused training identified in *FM 25-100, Training the Force* and *FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training*, provides a detailed process for deriving peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. It could be argued that there is no training dilemma; that doctrine does not say the Army should train for its most likely employment but places the primacy on the most dangerous employment (warfighting). However, leaders at all levels understand that in order for the Army to be relevant, it must be responsive to the requirements of the National Command Authority across the entire spectrum of conflict. Maintaining a wartime focus in a changing strategic environment where units are consistently employed for stability and support operations creates a training dilemma when it marginalizes a unit's proficiency to perform any task uniquely associated with MTW or MOOTW missions.

As discussed in the literature review, a number of authors concluded that a lack of flexibility in current training doctrine limited commanders from adding stability and support operation tasks to unit mission essential task lists (METL). Any flexibility derived from a generous interpretation of the METL development process identified in FM 25-100 is quickly quashed by FM 100-23 which states that, "Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit's mission-essential task list (METL)."⁸⁰ The purpose of this paper is not to revisit that debate but simply acknowledge the fact that the strategic environment has changed and that these nontraditional, non-warfighting operations call upon units to operate within command relationships uniquely different from their traditional wartime focus.

In addition to this METL development process, battle focused training provides a management cycle in recognition of the fact that units cannot attain proficiency to standard on all tasks or missions. This management cycle of preparation, planning, execution and feedback⁸¹ allows leaders to design successful training programs by narrowing the focus to a reduced number of vital tasks that are essential to mission accomplishment.⁸² Current doctrine maintains this narrow focus on wartime tasks while admitting that "units selected for these [peace operations] duties require time to train and prepare for a significant number of tasks that may be different from their wartime METL."⁸³ This requirement to conduct detailed mission rehearsal exercises (MRE) prior to deployment serves to challenge the relevancy and responsiveness of the Army.

Mission rehearsal exercises (MRE) are designed to provide additional mission-specific training opportunities for commanders, staffs or units alerted to conduct real-world missions. Recently they have become an integral part of training units in preparation for their assumption of stability and support operations. They have also been conducted in support of crisis action planning in support of Central Command and European Command.⁸⁴

Formal adoption of the MRE as a training tool for initial entry forces is highly contentious. Its use for follow on forces is less contentious but raises concerns about the current training model. At a time of challenges to the responsiveness and relevancy of the Army, the MRE appears to be a tacit admission that the Army has an alert-train-deploy model for employment. The model appears to accept that initial entry forces conducting stability and support operations, may not be proficient in all of the unique tasks associated with that type of mission. Any doubt placed in the minds of the soldiers,

commanders, CinCs, belligerents and besieged that the U.S. Armed Forces are fully prepared to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of conflict serves to threaten the success of the mission. It serves to weaken the confidence that the NCA has in the Army to continue in its role as the decisive and supported force.

Joint Doctrine


The focus of this doctrinal examination now shifts to joint doctrine and is intended to answer very similar questions: what does joint doctrine say about how the Army divisions and corps are going to be employed; what does joint doctrine say about the missions Army divisions and corps headquarters are expected to perform; and what does joint doctrine say about training? Just as with Army doctrine, this examination is less concerned with what doctrine says a headquarters should do once they are given a mission and more interested in what doctrine says a headquarters should do in peacetime. It is therefore, more an examination of training than operations.

This cursory examination of joint doctrine reveals a number of simple truths. The first is that joint doctrine is authoritative and will be followed except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.⁸⁵ It is a hierarchical relationship codified in law and requires that when conflict arises between joint publications and service publications, joint publications will take precedence. Finally, service doctrine must be consistent with approved joint doctrine.⁸⁶ Although joint doctrine is authoritative, it defers to service doctrine for establishing tasks, conditions and standards.

This requirement is significant and leads to the second point. Joint doctrine places the burden of training squarely on the shoulders of the service components. As stated in *Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, "The primary function of the

Services and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform roles-to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission.”⁸⁷ It is incumbent upon the services to ensure that the forces provided to CinCs are properly trained to perform the missions assigned.

Thirdly, joint doctrine is operational in nature and does not provide guidance to the services for peacetime training. That guidance is captured in a number of handbooks such as the *Joint Task Force Commander's Operations and Training Handbook* and guides such as the *Joint Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*.⁸⁸ The JTF HQ MTG was originally produced in 1994 and has been continually updated based upon lessons learned, TTPs and procedures developed during the UNIFIED ENDEAVOR exercises.⁸⁹ The current version was approved in 1997 as CJCSM 3500.05 to serve primarily as a training document designed to assist probable or designated JTF commanders and staffs in training and assessing the performance of individual and collective command and staff tasks during crisis situations.⁹⁰ This training guide is designed to be part of a series of publications that provides joint tasks, conditions, and standards for the training of joint organizations.⁹¹ Borrowing heavily from the Army, this guide uses a Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) as the basic hierarchy of tasks to be accomplished and organized along the sequential JTF “life-cycle.”⁹² Training plans are developed using a process nearly identical to Army *FM 25-100, Training the Force*, METL development model.⁹³



Since 1995 the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC) has been conducting joint training exercises for the Joint Warfighting Center (JWC) through state-of-the-art simulation and training, sophisticated facilities and realistic joint scenarios for joint force commanders (JFCs), staffs and component commanders.⁹⁴ The United States Joint Forces Command (formerly United States Atlantic Command) exercise program requires JTF crisis action planning (CAP) in a time constrained environment. Recent exercises have provided valuable lessons learned and TTPs for the Master Training Guide, JTF SOP and evolving or emerging doctrine.

Lastly, this doctrinal development process is evolving with much of the framework in place requiring additional development and publication of supporting and detailed products. From the JFCOM, J7s perspective, the greatest shortfall requiring immediate attention is the development of comprehensive joint operational doctrine for the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC).⁹⁵ This process must be jointly conducted with the Marine Corps and requires USJFCOM oversight to ensure that it does not conflict with current joint doctrine and to ensure uniformity in the service component responsibility for establishing tasks conditions and standards.

Summary, Analysis and Conclusions

This monograph has attempted to answer the research question; does the current training model for divisions and corps support employment as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF?

The answer is no. The wartime focus of Army training doctrine, lack of authoritative joint doctrine for peacetime training as well as the lack of doctrine at the operational level for the JFLCC represent significant holes in providing the direction necessary to ensure success when operating as a headquarters within this very complex environment. When coupled with the strategic environment outlined earlier and the expectation for divisions and corps from contingency plans and the historical examination, it is the assertion of this author, that these headquarters are not given the tools to adequately support their employment as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF and that any opportunity to train the division and corps staff outside of a joint environment is perhaps an inefficient use of scarce resources.

In arriving at this conclusion, this paper established criteria to evaluate the current training model through the affirmation or refutation of supporting or nested research questions. The paper then followed a methodical path to one, establish the need for and likelihood of these headquarters serving as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF; secondly, establish that current division and corps training, in terms of CTC and joint exercise programs, does not adequately support the requirements to serve as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF; thirdly, establish that current Army and joint doctrine does not support the employment of these headquarters serving as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF. Finally, this

paper concludes that shortfalls in training staff competencies do not represent a need to fundamentally change the way these headquarters are trained.

In establishing the need for and likelihood of these units serving as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF, this paper examined a number of sources to suggest the most likely employment of divisions and corps in the near future. This examination began with the strategic environment as established by our National Command Authority (NCA) through such sources as the National Security Strategy for the Next Century and the National Military Strategy of Shape, Respond, Prepare Now to identify the requirements for the military instrument of national power. It examined the requirements passed on to the Army through CinC contingencies and theater engagement plans as well as a historical examination of recent military operations. These sources were key to establishing a solid and supportable foundation for the critical assertion that not only is it possible for divisions and corps to serve in this capacity but that these are the most likely employment options for Army divisions and corps in the future.

The conclusion drawn from this examination is a strategic environment characterized as “dynamic and uncertain, replete with a host of threats and challenges that have the potential to grow more deadly, but also offering unprecedented opportunities to avert those threats and advance our interests.”⁹⁶ It is a strategic environment characterized by rising regional powers, asymmetric challenges including WMD, transnational dangers, and the likelihood of wild cards that cannot be specifically predicted.⁹⁷

The NSS reflects “the Presidents decision to exercise leadership abroad” and to be “prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence

the actions of other states and non-state actors.”⁹⁸ It outlines the use of the military instrument of national power encompassing the full range of military operations from small-scale contingency operations to general war. Not only must the U.S. military be prepared to successfully conduct multiple smaller-scale contingencies worldwide it must remain prepared to withdraw from contingency operations if needed to deploy to a major theater war.⁹⁹

The NMS states that the U.S. will remain globally engaged in order to advance and protect our national interests and that U.S. military power is, and will continue to be, fundamental to ensuring our national security.¹⁰⁰ The NMS calls upon the Armed Forces to **Shape** the international environment, **Respond** to the full spectrum of crisis, and **Prepare Now** for an uncertain future.¹⁰¹ Our Armed Forces’ core competence –the ability to apply decisive military power to deter or defeat acts of aggression –must remain the primary consideration in determining the structure, training and employment of our military forces.

The conclusions drawn from the historical examination reinforce the assertions made about the most likely employment of these headquarters as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF. These operations represent the complexity of joint operations even when they are predominately single-service in nature. They represent the nature of future U.S. major force projection operations in support of national interests and the need for rapid, seamless integration of capabilities. They also represent lessons learned the hard way and how fraught with the potential loss of life, operational success, public support, and international legitimacy these operations are when conducted in an ad hoc and parochial manner.

Finally, these conclusions are supported by an evaluation of current contingency planning and theater engagement plans that reflect the assessments contained within the NSS, NMS and other high-level documents. These assessments reflect the complexity of our strategic environment and the NMS of shaping, responding and preparing, requiring the flexibility to commit tailored force packages (including ARFORs, JFLCCs and JTFs) in response to immediate requirements that often do not conform to any available deliberate planning products.

In establishing how these units currently train, this paper examined a number of sources including division and corps training objectives from recent BCTP Warfighter Exercises and current joint exercise programs. These sources were key to establishing a solid and supportable conclusion on how divisions and corps train for comparison with the requirements established earlier.

An examination of the training objectives from recent Warfighter Exercises (WFX) conducted by BCTP reveals that despite the changing strategic environment, divisions and corps use this training event to work on core conventional warfighting competencies concentrated on a narrow portion of the fight and forgoing the tasks associated with deploying into a theater or integrating into a joint or multinational environment. Units habitually assigned to contingency missions and units returning from stability and support operations chose tasks associated with reestablishing competencies in core, conventional (offense, defense) fights in a mid to high intensity environment; and with battle command and staff operations at a conventional tempo.

The conclusion drawn from this examination is that divisions and corps are training for the most dangerous contingencies (i.e. JSCP warplans) and not for the most

likely (small-scale contingencies/stability and support operations). This is not a failure on the part of the CTC program. BCTP for example, offers the flexibility to tailor the exercise to the unique requirements of the player unit. This conclusion simply establishes how divisions and corps are training and supports assertions that perhaps the primacy of the wartime focus fails to adequately prepare these headquarters for more complex command and control relationships in more probable MOOTW missions.

In examining doctrinal support for the employment of these headquarters as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF, significant effort was made to analyze current and pending Army and joint doctrine. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that both Army and joint doctrine are moving in the right direction but have a tremendous amount of work ahead. Work is needed to establish a collection of authoritative doctrine flexible in its wartime MTW focus, sufficiently detailed in its guidance for peacetime joint training and without shifting responsibility from the service components, doctrine that provides forces adequately trained and immediately responsive to the combatant commanders.

The conclusion drawn from Army doctrine is that maintaining a doctrinal focus on warfighting in a changing strategic environment, where units are consistently employed for stability and support operations creates a training dilemma that doctrine fails to resolve satisfactorily. Army doctrine fails to fully acknowledge the fact that the strategic environment has changed and that non-traditional, non-warfighting operations call upon units to operate within command relationships uniquely different from their traditional wartime focus. Furthermore, current doctrine fails to provide leaders with adequate flexibility to tailor their training to emphasize stability and support operations and the current alert-train-deploy model for SASO including the requirement to conduct

detailed mission rehearsal exercises (MRE) prior to deployment serves to challenge the relevancy and responsiveness of the Army.

As stated in an FM 100-5 concept paper entitled, *Balancing Operations, Leadership and Training Doctrine*, "The Army needs a comprehensive and full-spectrum doctrine that provides guidance for diverse operations without losing the focus on warfighting."¹⁰² This doctrine must establish the necessary constructs for the conduct of prompt and sustained operations on land across the full spectrum of conflict and the full range of single-service, joint, multinational and interagency operations with a balanced approach to offense, defense stability, support and enabling activities.¹⁰³ The conclusions drawn from the examination of joint doctrine is that it is authoritative and will be followed except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.¹⁰⁴ Joint doctrine places the burden of training squarely on the shoulders of the service components to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform roles-to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission."¹⁰⁵ USJFCOM and current joint doctrine, handbooks and guides will continue to offer valuable direction for JTF training once the crisis action planning begins. The doctrine is operational in nature and USJFCOM remains reluctant to challenge service component responsibilities under Title 10 or provide authoritative direction for peacetime training outside CinC directed joint exercise programs. The JWC and JTASC will continue to serve as the focal point for providing input into evolving and emerging doctrinal development. Lastly, the joint doctrinal development process is in its infancy with frameworks in place that simply lack the detailed products.

Finally, this paper sought to establish whether these shortfalls in training staff competencies represents a need to fundamentally change the way these headquarters are trained. That question is rather subjective. For example, what some may consider as minor modifications to a prescriptive approach to warplans based METL development by allowing commanders the flexibility to incorporate MOOTW tasks; others may see that as a radical and fundamental change.

The conclusion drawn from this study is that despite the need for significant changes to training models, the shortfall in training competencies between what divisions and corps staffs are training to and what they can expect to perform does not represent a need to fundamentally change the way these headquarters are trained. It is the position of this author that the system outlined in FM 22-100, FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 is sound, it simply lacks adequate balance. Not all the blame for this shortfall can be thrust upon the training model. The model is simply a tool. We are constrained by doctrine to the degree to which we are unwilling to change it along with the evolving realities of our changing strategic environment and our demonstrated requirements.

The Army is in the process of taking a major step toward addressing the current doctrinal shortfalls. With the publication of *FM 22-100, Leadership* and the current revision of the “keystone” manual *FM 100-5, Operations*, the Army will establish the operational focus, carried throughout the remainder of its operational doctrine, and guiding the Army well into the next century. It will change the way the Army visualizes, describes and directs actions throughout the battlefield. It will frame the battle space in terms of shaping, decisive and sustaining operations within an operational framework of offense, defense, stability, support and enabling activities. What remains is to nest this

into joint doctrine for the JFLCC. Once this is accomplished, the Army and the Armed Forces will have a comprehensive operational doctrine for linking the strategic and tactical levels of war in joint operations.

Recommendations

The recommendations portion of this paper performs two functions. First it provides this authors opinion, supported by the accompanied analysis, on how to address some of the concerns that provide relevance to the research question. Secondly, it serves to provide suggestions for future study to address questions not fully explored within the relatively narrow scope of this work.

The first recommendation made is that significant work needs to continue in reworking Army and Joint doctrine. Much of that work is underway through TRADOC and JFCOM. Areas highlighted in this paper that need to be addressed include METL development, joint peacetime training guidance, and the lack of JFLCC doctrine.

Recommend that the Army adopt the position taken in FM-100-5 concept paper *Balancing Operations, Leadership and Training Doctrine* where commanders decide the training focus. Commanders would train for war unless they see or are given convincing reasons to shift their focus and train for military operation other than war (MOOTW). Commanders would be given the discretion to design their METL to strike a balance between warfighting and MOOTW.¹⁰⁶ This proposal is designed to remove the current constraints of focusing METL development entirely on warplans, preserve the effective training process as described in FM 25-100, and restore responsiveness to Army Forces.¹⁰⁷

With changes to METL development, Army and joint doctrine will begin the process of providing better authoritative guidance on peacetime service component and joint training. It is recommended that a greater emphasis be placed upon training events that incorporate the complexity, cooperation and coordination of joint operations. It will be further elaborated upon in the recommendation for changes to BCTP, but the point cannot be made more strongly that no staff training, especially at the corps level, should be done outside of a joint scenario requiring the staff to conduct force packaging, build and flow a time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL), conduct reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) and transition between levels of intensity. The majority of this work can be done at home-station and evaluated through simulation.

The decisive force fight needs to incorporate the integration of Army operations into a joint fight and the integration of sister-service members (habitual if possible) into an integrated staff. This fight, as outlined in an FM-100-5 concept paper entitled *Army Forces in Joint Operations* (yet to be published) must also incorporate the notion that the Army will not always be the supported command.¹⁰⁸ All of this works toward the goal of seamless integration into joint vice multi-service operations.

Furthermore, the joint community cannot allow service components to independently structure training for their forces without establishing a baseline across the services for joint operations. This is particularly important between the Army and Marines and leads into the last recommendation regarding the lack of doctrine for the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC). This is clearly an area where the Army and Marines need to find ways to compliment each other's capabilities. The difference between serving under an Army or Marine JFLCC should be imperceptible.

The standards and expectations should apply without parochial infighting or upstaging. It must include joint standards for proficiency in Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) tasks across all services.

The second major area of recommendations concerns adjustment to the mission and intent of the Battle Command Training Program. This program is central to training division and corps commanders and their staffs. Historically, it has not been used to its full potential. A number of initiatives are underway to address the focus of BCTP, especially in the coverage given to subordinate brigades. Other initiatives have been incorporated recently to reduce costs and provide increased training opportunities. These include the use of "imbedded warfighters", where divisions and corps are trained simultaneously as part of the same exercise, and "inclusive warfighters", where corps are trained as part of a joint exercise. The benefits of these initiatives go well beyond monetary and scheduling efficiencies and translate directly into training opportunities to fully exercise command relationships in a rigorous and stressful environment.

As discussed earlier, changes to doctrine will permit commanders to better structure this training and if required, shift the focus from mid to high-intensity attritionist warfare to crisis action, force projection, stability and support operations in a joint or coalition environment. In concert with changes to doctrine, BCTP must focus on getting to the fight, sustainment, working with non-governmental organizations and integrate/coordinate its operations with the Joint Warfighting Center. This recommendation does not suggest that the Army abdicate its role in certifying the proficiency of its corps to Joint Forces Command. It simply acknowledges that the

experience planning, executing and assessing joint training and the requirements to serve as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF may lie outside the Army.

The final recommendation is for future study. No research project fully addresses the questions that surround the subject at hand. The journey toward answering the research question should spark tangential questions not resolved within the narrow scope of the inquiry. The following are some suggested questions:

- What changes need to be made to the division and corps structure to support employment as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF?
- What are the small unit implications to giving commanders greater flexibility in identifying their METL?
- What should be the peacetime joint training requirements for divisions and corps?
- What should be the battlefield framework for joint operations in JFLCC doctrine?
- What should be the frequency and focus of traditional MTW training exercises where divisions and corps perform single service operations?
- What changes need to be made to the way we determine unit readiness. Are units successfully performing stability and support operations for real-world operations other than war really untrained?

Endnotes

¹ The President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct 98. See also Jablonsky, David. *Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 June 1995. page 33. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* page I-2 to I-3. "National Security Strategy is the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. It encompasses national defense, foreign relations, and economic relations and assistance; and aims, among other objectives, at providing a favorable foreign relations position, and a defense posture capable of defeating hostile action. As the national leadership generates national objectives and a national security strategy to pursue them, the leadership will also devise—or modify—the military instrument of national power as a component of national security strategy. This strategy takes the form of objectives for the development of broad military capabilities, their worldwide posture, and their functional and geographic orientation. In the event of armed conflict, this strategy will take the form of military objectives for the establishment of military conditions essential to support national security objectives and terminate the conflict on terms favorable to U.S. interests. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives."

² Jablonsky, David. *Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 June 1995. page 41. "*The National Military Strategy of the United States* is not a required document. National military strategy is addressed in a classified form by the JCS in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and by the Secretary of Defense in his mandatory, unclassified *Annual Report to The President and Congress*. Nevertheless, in 1989 as the Cold War faded, forces were set in train that generated a perceived need for such a document. To begin with, there was the general public expectation of a peace dividend as the long war in peace came to a close—an expectation clearly understood by the new Chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell."

³ Jablonsky, David. *Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 June 1995. page 35

⁴ Johnsen, William T. *The Future Roles of U.S. Military Power and Their Implications*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 18 April 1997. page 55. "Perhaps the most significant change that will occur in defining the future role of U.S. military power will be the realization that the function of the U.S. Armed Forces is not solely to fight and win America's wars. This construct is too narrow for the expected conditions of the 21st century, and will unnecessarily constrain U.S. policymakers. Instead, the role of military power must shift to the more general concept of *promoting* and protecting U.S. national interests. Granted, fighting and winning the nation's wars will remain the paramount responsibility of the U.S. Armed Forces, but the

United States can ill afford to sit back and wait for the big one while it dies a bureaucratic death by a thousand budget cuts. Thus, preventive defense must be added to and carefully balanced among the existing roles of deterrence, compellence, reassurance, and support to the nation.”

⁵ The President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1998 page 1.

⁶ Evidence provided throughout later portions of this paper support this assertion.

⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Vision 2010*. Washington, D.C.: GPO. See also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995. Department of the Army. *America's Army of the 21st Century: Force XXI*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995. Department of the Army. *Army Vision 2010*. Washington, D.C.: GPO. Department of the Army. *FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 1995. Department of the Army. *FM 100-15, Corps Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 1996. Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Papers*, TRADOC. unpublished

⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1995. page I-2 to I-3.

⁹ Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. *War and Anti War*. Boston: Little Brown, 1993

¹⁰ Huntington, Samuel. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

¹¹ Kaplan, Robert D. *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. New York: Random House, 1996.

¹² Ignatieff, Michael. *The Warrior's Honor*. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 1998.

¹³ Peters, Ralph. “The Culture of Future Conflict.” *Parameters* 25, no. Winter 1995-96 (1996): 18-27. “Future wars and violent conflicts will be shaped by the inabilities of governments to function as effective systems of resource distribution and control, and by the failure of entire cultures to compete in the post-modern age. The worldwide polarization of wealth, afflicting continents and countries, as well as individuals in all countries, will prove insurmountable, and social divisions will spark various forms of class warfare more brutal than anything imagined by Karl Marx. Post-state organizations, from criminal empires to the internationalizing media, will rupture the integrity of the nation-state. Niche technologies, such as post-modern means of

information manipulation and dissemination, will provoke at least as often as they produce, and will become powerful tools of conflict. Basic resources will prove inadequate for populations exploding beyond natural limits, and we may discover truths about ourselves that we do not wish to know. In the end, the greatest challenge may be to our moral order. The greatest dangers that could spark broad conventional wars will be resource competition and cultural confrontations—or a volatile combination of both, which could arise, for instance, in the Persian Gulf/Caspian Sea macro-region. Worldwide social bifurcation will lead increasingly to a triage approach to diplomacy, aid, and interventions, and a sobered West will prove necessarily selective in its military deployments, concentrating on financial interests and lifestyle protection. By the middle of the next century, if not before, the overarching mission of our military will be the preservation of our quality of life.”

¹⁴ Metz, Steven. “Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures.” *Parameters*. Autumn 1997. pages 15-26. “The orthodox position within the Army and the Department of Defense holds that the strategic environment of 2020 will be much like that of 1997. Sovereign nation states will remain the most important political units. Warfare will continue to be Clausewitzian as nation-states build militaries on a core of professionals and use them to promote or protect national interests. Diplomacy and deterrence will be the primary mechanisms to prevent armed violence. Because of misperception, aggression unleashed by autocratic regimes, or violence used by insurgents or separatists, these will sometimes fail and war will break out. Then coalitions of national armed forces will seek to thwart the aggression and restore a balance of power, or protect a state under attack from insurgents or separatists. While the orthodox position anticipates dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of militaries able to capitalize on the revolution in military affairs made possible by information technology, war will remain essentially political, episodic, violent, state-centric, and distinct from peace. The orthodox position expects only evolutionary change in the strategic environment.”

Alternative I: A Trisected Security System (First Tier: stability, prosperity, and multidimensional integration; Second Tier: Newly industrializing countries; Third Tier: economic stagnation, ungovernability and violence)

Alternative II: The Renaissance of Ideology (differences)

Alternative III: Internal Collapse

Alternative IV: The Commercialization of Warfare

Conclusions: “The alternative future security systems sketched out here are not mutually exclusive. The world of 2020 and beyond will be an admixture of each. The question is, which of the feasible forms of security and warfare will be the most strategically significant. While this cannot be predicted perfectly, there are two things the Army can do now to prepare. One is to use its impressive intellectual resources to cultivate an understanding of the features and implications of alternative long-term futures. The second is to inculcate conceptual, doctrinal, and organizational flexibility. Many of the feasible future security systems diverge radically from the orthodox position held by the Army, the other services, and the Department of Defense. In most of them, traditional

state-on-state warfare is insignificant. While it would certainly be premature for the U.S. Army to abandon its focus on this type of conflict now, it would be equally dangerous for it to refuse to move away from traditional warfighting if the security environment shows clear signs that such capabilities will not be important. The future will belong to those able to adapt rapidly. Strategic dinosaurs will find their eggs eaten by small mammals which did not initially appear to pose much of a danger."

¹⁵ Turbiville, Graham H. Jr., Colonel William W. Mendel and Jacob W. Kipp. "The Changing Security Environment." *Military Review*. May-June 1997 p.5
Developments changing future war's nature; shifting regional alignments; development of security threats not limited by national boundaries or affiliations; the interagency character of assessing and responding to threats; weapon and military technology proliferation; and the rapid pace of change. "The transitional nature and diversity of many key threats have created an environment where change, uncertainty and surprise are vital considerations in developing national and regional military strategies. A number of longstanding friends and former enemies are changing; thus, traditional relationships and alliances should be critically examined." See also Alexander, Bevin. *The Future of Warfare*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995. Galvin, John R. "Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm." *Parameters* (1986): 7. Skelton, Ike. "Joint and Combined Operations in the Post-Cold War Era." *Military Review* (September 1993), page 2. Sullivan, Gordon R. and James M. Dubik. "Land Warfare in the 21st Century." *Military Review* (September 1993), page 13. Epley, William W. *Roles and Missions of the United States Army*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1995. Gregor, William J. *Toward a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs. Understanding the United States Military in the Post Cold War World*. (1996). Jablonsky, David. *Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

¹⁶ Sullivan, Gordon R. and Colonel James M. Dubik. "Land Warfare in the 21st Century." *Military Review* (September 1993). See also Sullivan, Gordon R. and Anthony M. Corrales. *The Army in the Information Age*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 31 March 1995. Sullivan, Gordon R. and Colonel James M. Dubik. *War in the Information Age*. Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army War College, 1994. Mazarr, Michael. *The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994. Metz, Steven and James Kievit. *The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994.

¹⁷ Van Riper, Paul and Robert H. Scales Jr. "Preparing for War in the 21st Century." *Parameters*. Autumn 1997 page 14.

¹⁸ Baumann, Robert F. "Historical Perspectives on Future War." *Military Review* (1997 March - April): 40-48.

¹⁹ Arnold, Major General S.L. & Major David T. Stahl. "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War." *Parameters*, no. Winter 1993-1994 (1993): 4-26.

See Also Burk, James. "Why Peacekeeping?" *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 3 (1997). Dubik, Brigadier General James. "The Army's 2nd Training Revolution." *Armed Forces Journal International* (1994). Hardesty, Michael J. *Training For Peace: The U.S. Army's Post-Cold War Strategy*. United States Institute of Peace, 1996. Joulwan, George A. "Operations Other Than War: A CinCs Perspective." *Military Review* 74 (1994): 4-10.

²⁰ Bong, David J. "Preparing For Peacekeeping Operations Through Battle Focused Training." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 93-94. Oriented at the small unit level, this study found significant parallels between Peacekeeping requirements and supporting tasks derived from Battle Focused Training (page 36-42). See also Beech, Michael F. "Quasi-War: Training Infantry Small Units for Operations Other than War." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 95-96. Beech found that many warfighting skills are not directly transferable when conducting OOTW. Many tasks appear similar but are performed differently and require specialized training.

²¹ FM 100-5 Writing Team concept paper #1 *The Doctrinal Focus of FM 100-5, Operations*. TRADOC. page 13. "Additionally, we must identify and accentuate training on individual, leader, and collective tasks that comprise common core competencies applicable across the range of military actions—war and peacetime engagement. Proficiency in these tasks promotes the versatility and agility necessary for soldiers, leaders, and units to rapidly respond to changing mission requirements. Through continual application on mission deployments, these core competencies are enhanced, not degraded. Both increased task proficiency and enhanced unit cohesion developed during extended deployments facilitate a rapid return to warfighting task proficiency after deployment."

²² Cabney, Richard M. "Peacekeeping Tasks in the METL: The Dilemma of Direct Support Artillery." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 97-98. Holds an interpretation of current army doctrine (25-100, 25-101, 100-23) to conclude that peacekeeping tasks are unjustly excluded from METL development. See also Flynn, Michael J. "Battle Focused Training for Peacekeeping Operations: A METL Adjustment for Infantry Battalions." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 96-97. Martins, Mark S. "The Small Change of Soldiering? Peace Operations as Preparation for Future Wars." Monograph, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1998. Stewart, Michael D. MAJ. "A Small View of War: Toward a Broader FM 100-5." Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

²³ Rizzo, Christopher J. "War or Operations Other Than War: The Light Force Leader's Training Dilemma." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 96-97. Draws the conclusion that Peacekeeping and warfighting tasks are often required within the same operation as sequential or simultaneous tasks. Draws similar conclusions that they need to be better addressed in doctrine to give leaders a more fully developed framework for individual and collective training.

²⁴ Shinseki, Eric CSA comments in 1999 AUSA Greenbook, 1999 AUSA Convention and Army Times, 25 October 1999.

²⁵ Betros, Lance A. "Coping with Uncertainty: The Joint Task Force and Multi-Service Military Operations." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1991. The JTF offers a command structure that has the potential to overcome the effects of uncertainty—decentralized execution, semi-autonomous multi-service forces, low decision threshold. (pages 43-44). See also Bryant, Colonel Albert Jr. "Meeting the U.S. Army's Service Component Command (ASCC) Requirements for Peace Enforcement Operations." Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. Doughty, Robert A. "Reforming Joint Doctrine." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 1993). Doyle, Kevin J. "Training The Versatile Staff." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1994. Excellent monograph on the need for versatility training for division staffs to deal with the uncertainty of our changed/changing strategic environment. Also holds a rather narrow view on the restrictions of army doctrine to the inclusion of any OOTW tasks or OOTW focus. Ellerson, Jack and Robert Kloecker. "The Challenge of Joint Force Training - USEUCOM's Approach to Preparing the Force." November 1993. Graham, Bill. "The Joint Warfighting Center." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 1993). Sullivan, Gordon R. "Doctrine: A Guide to the Future." *Military Review* (February 1992). pages 3-9. "The Total Army is looking to the future and shaping its destiny. There are some who do not appreciate the magnitude of the changes the Army is making; there are some who believe that the future Army will be simply a smaller version of the Cold War Army—that we will end up doing business as usual on a reduced scale. They are wrong! The Cold War is over—victory was achieved. Now we are changing in fundamental ways to adapt to the new world in which we live. We are moving out toward our vision of the Army of the future. Doctrine guides us on the journey...Joint operations are the norm." Ross, Blair A. "The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. Sandoy, Andrew S. "The Land Component Commander: Is One Required?" Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990. This monograph addresses the tension between the army and CinCs in the establishment of a LCC. Sterling, John E. "The Corps in the JTF Role." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.

²⁶ Bongi, David J. "Preparing For Peacekeeping Operations Through Battle Focused Training." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 93-94. See also Findlay, Michael L. "Special Forces Integration with Multinational Division-North in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 97-98. Discussed some of the difficulties of integrating forces into a joint environment...on this case the focus was on SOF-conventional differences but the findings seem applicable to sister services as well. Frandsen, Burt. "The Battle Command Training Program: An Evaluation of BCTP and the Application of Airland Battle." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1989. Gibbons, Edward G. Jr. "Learning Under Fire: Training an

Army While at War.” Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 95-96. Quotes J.F.C. Fuller Nothing is more dangerous in war than to rely on peace training: for in modern times, when war is declared, training has always proved out of date. Discusses the need to adapt training to the battlefield while actively engaged in war. The key to the ability to get it right quickly when the moment arrives is to prepare the learning and teaching organs before the shooting starts, since to wait to do so while under fire may be too late. (page 45) Gorrie, Robert G. “Joint Battle Staff Training.” Monograph, US Naval War College, 1991. His concerns for adequate joint training in the army remain largely unanswered. An excellent paper on BCTP and the need to fundamentally change the way we train divisions and corps. Scudder, John V. “Talk’n Aint Fight’n Synchronization and the Joint Task Force Training Process.” Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 93-94.

²⁷ The President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct 98. page iii.

²⁸ Jablonsky, David. *Time’s Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 June 1995. page 33. Original source cited by Jablonsky: Section 108[50 USC 404a] (a) (1), National Security Act of 1947 as amended by Public Law 99-433, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 1 October 1986, particularly Section 104(b) (3 & 4). See also Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 2nd ed., Carlisle Barracks: Department of National Security and Strategy, July 1994, p. 2 and Glen A Kent and William E. Simmons, *Objective-Based Planning, New Challenges for Defense Planning*, p. 60.

²⁹ The six tenets of the Weinberger Doctrine (as drawn from Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, *The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine* Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1988 are these:

I. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.

II. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.

III. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have, and send, the forces needed to do just that.

IV. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed-their size, composition, and disposition-must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.

V. Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation.

VI. The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

³⁰ Jablonsky, David. *Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 June 1995. page 34

³¹ Ibid., page 35

³² Ibid., page 35

³³ Johnsen, William T. *The Future Roles of U.S. Military Power and Their Implications*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 18 April 1997. page 55.

³⁴ The President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct 98. page iii. The National Security Strategy is submitted in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986. "This strategy calls for an integrated approach among the instruments of national power to accomplish three core objectives: To enhance our security, to bolster America's economic prosperity, to promote democracy abroad."

³⁵ Ibid., page 1. Challenges and opportunities: "The security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncertain, replete with a host of threats and challenges that have the potential to grow more deadly, but also offering unprecedented opportunities to avert those threats and advance our interests."

³⁶ Ibid., page 1. Imperatives of engagement: "Our strategic approach recognizes that we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we cannot lead abroad unless we are strong at home. We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors. In many instances, the United States is the only nation capable of providing the necessary leadership and capabilities for an international response to shared challenges."

³⁷ Ibid., page 21.

³⁸ Ibid., page 21.

³⁹ Directly from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-03.1: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I*. Washington, D.C: GPO, 4 August 1993. page I-1.

⁴⁰ Ibid., page II-1

⁴¹ Ibid., page II-1

⁴² Ibid., page II-1- II-2

⁴³ Ibid., page II-2- II-4

⁴⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997. page 5. The National Military Strategy (NMS) provides advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Combatant Commanders, to the National Command Authorities (NCA) on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. Based on a National Security Strategy for a New Century, approved by the President of the United States in October 1998, and the report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the NMS describes the strategic environment, develops national military objectives, and describes the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. As an unclassified document, it makes this advice accessible to the widest range of government officials, interested citizens and foreign leaders.

⁴⁵ Jablonsky, David. *Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 June 1995. page 41

⁴⁶ Ibid., page 43

⁴⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995. page I-2 to I-3

⁴⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997. page 30. Conclusion: "In both the 1997 National Security Strategy and the QDR report, the President and the Secretary of Defense introduced an integrated strategic approach embodied by the terms Shape, Respond and Prepare Now. The 1997 National Military Strategy is based on these concepts. It builds on the premise that the United States will remain globally engaged to Shape the international environment and create conditions favorable to U.S. interests and global security. It emphasizes that our Armed Forces must Respond to the full spectrum of crisis in order to protect our national interests. It further states that as we pursue shaping and responding activities, we must also take steps to Prepare Now for an uncertain future. Principal among the threats to the America's security are regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational threats and wild cards. This National Military Strategy, building on the foundation of previous edition supports the President's *A National Security Strategy for the New Century* and the QDR report. It carries forward the theme

that U.S. military power is, and will continue to be, fundamental to ensuring our national security. The United States will remain the world's only global power for the near-term, but will operate in a strategic environment characterized by rising regional powers, asymmetric challenges including WMD, transnational dangers, and the likelihood of wild cards that cannot be specifically predicted. The dangers we could face can be mitigated by military activities that Shape the strategic environment and Respond to the full spectrum of crisis, while Preparing our Armed Forces now for an uncertain future. The force structure described in this document and our overseas presence, combined with our ability to rapidly project combat power anywhere in the world, provides the strategic agility we will require to meet the challenges we are likely to face. As we pursue the President's strategy for enhancing our security in this new era, the demand for military capabilities and skills is unlikely to diminish, both to deter and defeat aggression in two distant and overlapping MTWs, and in roles other than traditional warfighting. Our Armed Forces' core competence –the ability to apply decisive military power to deter or defeat acts of aggression –must remain the primary consideration in determining the structure, training and employment of our military forces. We cannot know with certainty who our foes will be or where our forces will be needed in the future. In a time of both uncertainty and promise, this National Military Strategy and our Armed Forces provide our Nation with the means to protect our interests and promote a peace that benefits America and all like-minded nations.”

⁴⁹ Ibid., page 30

⁵⁰ Ibid., pages 11-20

⁵¹ Ibid., page 30

⁵² Ibid., page 7

⁵³ Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, The Doctrinal Focus of FM 100-5, Operations*. TRADOC page 5.

⁵⁴ Adkins, Mark. *URGENT FURY, The Battle for Grenada*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988. See also Bolger, Daniel P. *Americans At War, 1975-1986, An Era of Violent Peace*. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Cole, Ronald H. *Urgent Fury: The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Planning and Executing of Rescue and Combat Operations in Grenada, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Washington: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1988. Rizzo, Christopher J. “War or Operations Other Than War: The Light Force Leader's Training Dilemma.” Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996. Ross, Blair A. “The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations.” Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. Sterling, John E. “The Corps in the JTF Role.” Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.

⁵⁵ Briggs, Clarence E. III. *Operation Just Cause, Panama December 1989*. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books. 1990. See also Behar, David S. and Godfrey Harris. *Invasion: The*

American Destruction of the Noriega Regime in Panama. Los Angeles: The Americas Group, 1990. Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*. New York: Lexington Books, 1991. Martins, Mark S. "The Small Change of Soldiering? Peace Operations as Preparation for Future Wars." Monograph, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1998. Rizzo, Christopher J. "War or Operations Other Than War: The Light Force Leader's Training Dilemma." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996. Ross, Blair A. "The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. Sterling, John E. "The Corps in the JTF Role." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1992. Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, The Visualize, Describe, Direct Methodology*. TRADOC. Unpublished

⁵⁶ Clancy, Tom, and Fred Franks. *Into The Storm : A Study In Command*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1997. See Also Yeosock, John J. "Army Operations in the Gulf Theater." *Military Review*, no. Sept 91 (1991): 2-15. Martins, Mark S. "The Small Change of Soldiering? Peace Operations as Preparation for Future Wars." Monograph, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1998. Ross, Blair A. "The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

⁵⁷ Allard, Kenneth. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995. See Also Headquarters 10th Mountain Division Light. "Somalia, US Army Forces. After Action Report." Fort Drum, NY: 2 June 1993. Martins, Mark S. "The Small Change of Soldiering? Peace Operations as Preparation for Future Wars." Monograph, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1998. Rizzo, Christopher J. "War or Operations Other Than War: The Light Force Leader's Training Dilemma." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

⁵⁸ Headquarters 10th Mountain Division Light. "Operations in Haiti, August 1994 thru January 1995, US Army Forces. After Action Report." Fort Drum, NY: See also Fishel, John T. "Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles, New Realities." *Military Review* (1997): 22. Martins, Mark S. "The Small Change of Soldiering? Peace Operations as Preparation for Future Wars." Monograph, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1998. Rizzo, Christopher J. "War or Operations Other Than War: The Light Force Leader's Training Dilemma." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

⁵⁹ Wentz, Larry. *Lessons From Bosnia, The IFOR Experience*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997. See Also Martins, Mark S. "The Small Change of Soldiering? Peace Operations as Preparation for Future Wars." Monograph, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1998.

⁶⁰ Examination of current contingency planning was derived from information gathered from division and corps planners to the extent that they could elaborate in

general terms about the expected command structure for their wartime and small-scale contingency plans.

⁶¹ Department of the Army. *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations*. 1 August 1994. page 2-1

⁶² Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 350-50. Combat Training Center Program*. 24 May 1995. page 1

⁶³ *Ibid.*, page 1.

⁶⁴ Examination of training objectives is based upon the author's previous assignment to BCTP as an Observer/ Controller and as the BCTP G1. In that time the author had access to all player unit Final Exercise Reports (FERs) containing the expressed training objectives of the unit. Due to the sensitive nature of the reports, specific information is not included in the paper.

⁶⁵ BCTP conducted MREs in support of both the US Central Command and US European Command.

⁶⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary Military and Associated Terms with JMTGM changes*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 23 March 1994 amended 15 April 1998. See also FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 30 September 1997.

⁶⁷ Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, The Doctrinal Focus of FM 100-5, Operations*. TRADOC. Unpublished. page 1.

⁶⁸ Department of the Army. *FM 100-1, The Army*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 1994. page v.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, page v.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, page v.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, page v.

⁷² Department of the Army. *FM 100-15, Corps Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 1996. page 1-1

⁷³ *Ibid.*, page 1-3.

⁷⁴ Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate. *Corps as a Warfighting Headquarters (concept paper)*. Unpublished. 23 June 1999.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Department of the Army. *FM 100-5, Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993. page 2-0.

⁷⁷ Department of the Army. *FM 100-23, Peace Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994. page 86.

⁷⁸ Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, Balancing Operations, Leadership, and Training Doctrine*. TRADOC. Unpublished. page 1.

⁷⁹ Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, The Doctrinal Focus of FM 100-5 Operations*. TRADOC. Unpublished. page 16.

⁸⁰ Department of the Army. *FM 100-23, Peace Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994. page 86.

⁸¹ Department of the Army. *FM 25-100, Training the Force*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 1988. page 1-9.

⁸² Ibid., page 1-7.

⁸³ Department of the Army. *FM 100-23, Peace Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994. page 86.

⁸⁴ BCTP conducted MREs in support of both the US Central Command and US European Command.

⁸⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995. page i

⁸⁶ Ibid., page i.

⁸⁷ Ibid., page I-6.

⁸⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *CJCS 3500.05: Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*. Washington, D.C.: GPO.

⁸⁹ United States Atlantic Command. *Joint After Action Reports (JULLS)*. September 1998. Executive Summary

⁹⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *CJCS 3500.05: Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*. Washington, D.C.: GPO. Page 1-1.

⁹¹ Ibid., page 1-1.

⁹² Ibid., page 1-4.

⁹³ Ibid., page 3-1.

⁹⁴ United States Atlantic Command. *Joint After Action Reports (JULLS)*. September 1998. Executive Summary

⁹⁵ Phone conversation 2 November 1999 with LTC Steve Senkovich, Deputy Doctrine Division Chief, JWFC. senkovic@jwfc.jfcom.mil

⁹⁶ The President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct 98. page 1.

⁹⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997. page 30.

⁹⁸ The President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct 98. page 1.

⁹⁹ Ibid., page 21.

¹⁰⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997. page 30.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pages 11-20.

¹⁰² Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, Balancing Operations, Leadership, and Training Doctrine*. TRADOC. Unpublished. page 1.

¹⁰³ Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, The Doctrinal Focus of FM 100-5 Operations*. TRADOC. Unpublished. page 16.

¹⁰⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995. page i

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., page I-6.

¹⁰⁶ Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, Balancing Operations, Leadership, and Training Doctrine*. TRADOC. Unpublished. page 12.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., page 13.

¹⁰⁸ Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, Army Forces in Joint Operations*. TRADOC. Unpublished.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Books

- Adkin, Mark. *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada*. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989.
- Alexander, Bevin. *The Future of Warfare*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995.
- Allard, Kenneth. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995.
- Behar, David S. and Godfrey Harris. *Invasion: The American Destruction of the Noriega Regime in Panama*. Los Angeles: The Americas Group, 1990.
- Bolger, Daniel P. *Americans At War, 1975-1986, An Era of Violent Peace*. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988.
- Briggs, Clarence E. *Operation Just Cause*. Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1990.
- Clancy, Tom, and Fred Franks. *Into The Storm : A Study In Command*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1997.
- Cole, Ronald H. *Urgent Fury: The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Planning and Executing of Rescue and Combat Operations in Grenada, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Washington: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1988.
- Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. *Operation Just Cause : The Storming of Panama*. New York: Lexington Books, 1991.
- Epley, William W. *Roles and Missions of the United States Army*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1995.
- Gottlieb, Sanford. *Defense Addiction: Can America Kick the Habit?* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
- Ignatieff, Michael. *The Warrior's Honor*. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 1998.
- Jablonsky, David. *Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

Jablonsky, David. *Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 June 1995.

Johnsen, William T. *The Future Roles of U.S. Military Power and Their Implications*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 18 April 1997.

Kanter, Arnold. *U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World, New Challenges and New Responses*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994.

Kaplan, Robert D. *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. New York: Random House, 1996.

Lyons, Terrence. *Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*. Washington D.C.: Brookings W.W. Norton & Company, 1994.

Mazarr, Michael. *The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994.

Metz, Steven and James Kievit. *The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994.

Sabrosky, Alan Ned and Robert L. Sloane, *The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine*. Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1988

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. *War and Anti War*. Boston: Little Brown, 1993

Wentz, Larry. *Lessons From Bosnia, The IFOR Experience*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997.

Articles and Reports

Arnold, Major General S.L. & Major David T. Stahl. "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War." *Parameters*, no. Winter 1993-1994 (1993): 4-26.

Baumann, Robert F. "Historical Perspectives on Future War." *Military Review* (1997 March - April): 40-48.

Burk, James. "Why Peacekeeping?" *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 3 (1997).

Burnette, Thomas N., Jr. "The Second Training Revolution." *Army*. Oct 1997 (1997): 111-116.

- Cohen, William S. Secretary of Defense. "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review." *The Officer* (1997): 26-36.
- Doughty, Robert A. "Reforming Joint Doctrine." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 1993).
- Dubik, Brigadier General James. "The Army's 2nd Training Revolution." *Armed Forces Journal International* (1994).
- Ellerson, Jack and Robert Kloecker. "The Challenge of Joint Force Training - USEUCOM's Approach to Preparing the Force.", November 1993.
- Fishel, John T. "Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles, New Realities." *Military Review* (1997): 22.
- Galvin, John R. "Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm." *Parameters* (1986): 7.
- Graham, Bill. "The Joint Warfighting Center." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 1993).
- Grange, David L. "The Readiness Factor, A Prescription for Preparing the Army for All Contemporary Challenges." *Armed Forces Journal International* (1997).
- Headquarters 10th Mountain Division Light. "Operations in Haiti, August 1994 thru January 1995, US Army Forces. After Action Report." Fort Drum, NY:
- Headquarters 10th Mountain Division Light. "Somalia, US Army Forces. After Action Report." Fort Drum, NY: 2 June 1993.
- Joulwan, George A. "Operations Other Than War: A CINC's Perspective." *Military Review* 74 (1994): 4-10.
- Kagan, Donald. "Panel #1: Missions." *The Demilitarization of the Military: Report of a Defense Task Force* (1997): 13-21.
- Kahan, James P. "Implementing the Battle Command Training Program." Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1989.
- McDonough, Colonel James R. "And the Army Goes Rolling Along: But Where To?" *Army* (1998): 11-13.
- Metz, Steven. "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures." *Parameters*. Autumn 1997.
- Morgan, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas D. "BCTP: Preparing for War." *Military Review* (1989): 2-10.
- Morgan, Thomas D. "BCTP-Training Leaders." *Military Review* (July 1990).

- Peters, Ralph. "The Culture of Future Conflict." *Parameters* 25, no. Winter 1995-96 (1996): 18-27.
- Reimer, Dennis J. "Training: Our Army's Top Priority And Don't You Forget It." *Military Review* LXXVI (July-August 1996).
- Shinseki, Eric K. "Beginning The Next 100 Years." *Army Green Book*. October 1999
- Shinseki, Eric K. "Radical Changes; Gen. Shinseki Unveils his 21st-Century Plans." *Army Times*. 25 October, 1999.
- Skelton, Ike. "Joint and Combined Operations in the Post-Cold War Era." *Military Review* (September 1993)
- Spigelmire, Michael F. "BCTP and the Victory Division." *Military Review* (October 1988).
- "Strategic Survey 1996/1997." London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996/1997.
- Sullivan, Gordon R. "Doctrine: A Guide to the Future." *Military Review* 72, no. Feb 92 (1992): 2-9.
- Sullivan, Gordon R. "Flexibility Sets the Pace at Combat Training Centers." *Army Magazine Green Book* (July 1993).
- Sullivan, Gordon R. and Anthony M. Coroalles. *The Army in the Information Age*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 31 March 1995.
- Sullivan, Gordon R. and Colonel James M. Dubik. "Land Warfare in the 21st Century." *Military Review* (September 1993).
- Sullivan, Gordon R. and Colonel James M. Dubik. *War in the Information Age*. Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army War College, 1994.
- "Technology versus the Moral Element: Emerging Views in the Russian Officer Corps, 1870-1904." *New Perspectives in Modern Russian History* (1992): 43-64.
- "The Military Balance." London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997/1998.
- Tillson, John C.F. "Building a Joint Training Readiness Reporting System." *Joint Force Quarterly* (1996): 22-28.

- Turbiville, Graham H. Jr., Colonel William W. Mendel and Jacob W. Kipp. "The Changing Security Environment." *Military Review*. May-June 1997
- Van Riper, Paul and Robert H. Scales Jr. "Preparing for War in the 21st Century." *Parameters*. Autumn 1997
- Walz, Robert D. "The Joint Strategic Planning Systems; Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System; and Joint Operational Planning and Execution System." *DJCO Selected Readings Book (Module 1), 3-B-1* (1997).
- Winkler, John D. and Paul S. Steinberg. "Restructuring Military Education and Training." Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 1997.
- Yeosock, John J. "Army Operations in the Gulf Theater." *Military Review*, no. Sept 91 (1991): 2-15.

Monograph and Thesis

- Beech, Michael F. "'Quasi-War': Training Infantry Small Units for Operations Other than War." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 95-96.
- Betros, Lance A. "Coping with Uncertainty: The Joint Task Force and Multi-Service Military Operations." United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.
- Bongi, David J. "Preparing For Peacekeeping Operations Through Battle Focused Training." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 93-94.
- Bryant, Colonel Albert Jr. "Meeting the U.S. Army's Service Component Command (ASCC) Requirements for Peace Enforcement Operations." Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1997.
- Bullock, Harold E. "Peace by Committee, Command and Control Issues in Multinational Peace Enforcement Operations." U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995.
- Byrd, Duane E. "Command and Control Considerations for Field Army Operations: A Primer on Joint Operations." Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986.
- Cabney, Richard M. "Peacekeeping Tasks in the METL: The Dilemma of a Direct Support Artillery." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 97-98.

Cushman, John H. "Command and Control of Theater Forces: The Korea Command and Other Cases." Harvard University Press, 1987.

Doyle, Kevin J. "Training The Versatile Staff." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1994.

Findlay, Michael L. "Special Forces Integration with Multinational Division-North in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 97-98.

Flynn, Michael J. "Battle Focused Training for Peacekeeping Operations: A METL Adjustment for Infantry Battalions." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 96-97.

Frandsen, Burt. "The Battle Command Training Program: An Evaluation of BCTP and the Application of Airland Battle." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1989.

Galloway, Archibald. "Operational Functions of U.S. Army contingency Headquarters-- Do They Meet the Requirements for the Operational Level of War?" Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986.

Gibbons, Edward G. Jr. "Learning Under Fire: Training an Army While at War." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 95-96.

Gorrie, Robert G. "Joint Battle Staff Training." Monograph, US Naval War College, 1991.

Gregor, William J. "Toward a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs. Understanding the United States Military in the Post Cold War World." (1996).

Hardesty, Michael J. "Training For Peace: The U.S. Army's Post-Cold War Strategy." United States Institute of Peace, 1996.

Helmly, James R. "Future US Military Strategy: The Need for a Standing Joint Task Force." US Army War College, 1991.

Kier, Elizabeth. "Changes in Conventional Military Doctrines: Cultural Roots of Doctrinal Change." Ph.D. Dissertation, 1992.

Lockwood, William C. "Command and Control of Land Forces During Joint Operations." U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989.

Martins, Mark S. "The "Small Change" of Soldiering? Peace Operations as Preparation for Future Wars." Monograph, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1998.

- Mason, Major Bradley J. "Assault Helicopter Contingency Operations." Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.
- Norberg, Joseph M. "Joint Initial Entry Training." United States Army War College, 1996.
- Ratliff, Leslie L. "Joint Task Force Somalia, A Case Study." United States Naval War College, 1996.
- Rehorn, Wesley L. "Is Joint Special Operations Individual Training Really Joint?" Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1997.
- Rizzo, Christopher J. "War or Operations Other Than War: The Light Force Leader's Training Dilemma." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 96-97
- Ross, Blair A. "The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.
- Sandoy, Andrew S. "The Land Component Commander: Is One Required?" Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990.
- Scudder, John V. "'Talk'n Aint Fight'n' Synchronization and the Joint Task Force Training Process." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 93-94.
- Sterling, John E. "The Corps in the JTF Role." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.
- Stewart, Michael D. MAJ. "A Small View of War: Toward a Broader FM 100-5." Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.
- Tucker, Christopher MAJ. "U.S. Army Command and Control at the Operational Level: Where Do We Go From Here?" Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.

Doctrinal References and Manuals

- Armed Forces Staff College. *AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1993*. Norfolk, VA, 1993.
- Armed Forces Staff College. *AFSC Pub 2, Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces*. Norfolk, VA, August 1992.

Binnendijk, Hans Editor-in-Chief. *Strategic Assessment 1996 Instruments of U.S. Power*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *CJCS 3500.05, Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*. Washington, D.C.: GPO.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 1997.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 1-01 c1, Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine & Joint Tactics, Techniques & Procedures Development Program*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary Military and Associated Terms with JMTGM changes*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 23 March 1994 amended 15 April 1998.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 1-03.21, Joint Operations Planning and Execution System Reporting Structure*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-07.3, JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-08 (Vol I), Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-08 (Vol II), Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities*. Washington, D.C.: GPO.

- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Doctrine*. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-56, Command & Control Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 13 April 1995.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2 September 1991.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 4 August 1993.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-03.2, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 15 March 1992.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Vision 2010*. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Manual 3500.04, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 1996.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Version 2.1*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 15 May 1995.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Version 3.0*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 13 September 1996.
- Chapman, Anne W. *The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990: An Overview*. Fort Monroe, Virginia: Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991.
- Chapman, Anne W. *The National Training Center Matures, 1985-1993*. Fort Monroe, Virginia: Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1997.
- Chapman, Anne W. *The Origins and Development of the National Training Center 1976-1984*. Fort Monroe, Virginia: Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992.

Department of the Army. *America's Army of the 21st Century: Force XXI*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.

Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 350-50. Combat Training Center Program*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 24 May 1995.

Department of the Army. *Army Vision 2010*. Washington, D.C.: GPO.

Department of the Army. *FM 100-1, The Army*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 1994.

Department of the Army. *FM 100-5, Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993.

Department of the Army. *FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics*. Washington, D.C.: GPO 30 September 1997.

Department of the Army. *FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 1995.

Department of the Army. *FM 100-8, The Army in Multinational Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 1997.

Department of the Army. *FM 100-15, Corps Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 1996.

Department of the Army. *FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 1992.

Department of the Army. *FM 25-100, Training the Force*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 1988.

Department of the Army. *FM 25-101, Training the Force: Battle Focused Training*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, September 1990.

Department of Defense. "1991 Joint Military Net Assessment." Washington, D.C.: DoD, 1991.

Department of the Army. *TRADOC Regulation 350-50, Battle Command Training Program*. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1998.

Department of the Army. *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned Volume I. Soldiers and Leadership*. Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1990.

Department of the Army. *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1 August 1994.

Joint Warfighting Center. *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*. Suffolk, Virginia: Joint Warfighting Center, 1995.

President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994.

President of The United States. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.

President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998.

Romjue, John L., Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman. *Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1993*. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, United States Training and Doctrine Command, 1993.

Sherlock, James C. "USACOM's Joint Training Simulation Center (JTASC)". Norfolk, VA: USACOM, October 1993.

USACOM. *USACOM JTF Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures*. Norfolk, VA: USACOM Joint Doctrine Branch, June 1998.

USACOM. *USACOM Report Card on Joint Training*. Norfolk, VA: USACOM Joint Doctrine Branch, 1998.

Unpublished Sources

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate. *Corps as a Warfighting Headquarters (concept paper)*. Unpublished. 23 June 1999.

Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, The Doctrinal Focus of FM 100-5 Operations*. TRADOC. Unpublished

Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, The Range of Army Operations*. TRADOC. Unpublished

Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, The Operational Framework*. TRADOC. Unpublished

Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, The Visualize, Describe, Direct Methodology*. TRADOC. Unpublished

Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, Balancing Operations, Leadership, and Training Doctrine*. TRADOC. Unpublished.

Department of the Army. *FM 100-5 Concept Paper, Army Forces in Joint Operations*.
TRADOC. Unpublished.

Phone conversation 2 November 1999 with LTC Steve Senkovich, Deputy Doctrine
Division Chief, JWFC. senkovic@jwfc.jfcom.mil.

Shinseki, Eric K. CSA comments to the 1999 AUSA Convention, October 1999.